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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Article VIII, § 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1987), because the Utah
Court of Appeals has no original appellate jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(1987). The Supreme Court has exercised its
discretion to transfer this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1987) and the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction in this case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1987) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One:

Whether the district court abused its discretion

by conducting proceedings to determine the value of Slattery's
stock.
Statement of Review:

The appellate court will review the

district court's decision to receive evidence on the value of
Slattery's stock on an abused of discretion standard.

Street v.

Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948).
The appellate court can only reverse the trial court for an abuse
of discretion when there is no reasonable basis for the decision of
the trial court.

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d

937, 938 (Utah 1993).
Issue Two:

Whether the district court abused its discretion

by allowing Slattery to amend her complaint and by conducting
proceedings to determine Slattery's appellate attorney's fees and
costs.

1

Standard of Review:

The appellate court will review the

district court's decision to receive evidence on the cost of
Slattery's

attorney's

fees

and

costs

on

appeal

and

at

the

subsequent evidentiary hearing on an abused of discretion standard.
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153
(1948).

The appellate court can only reverse the trial court for

an abuse of discretion when there is no reasonable basis for the
decision of the trial court. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
Slattery objects to the characterization of the issues as
11

jurisdictional" and the standard of review as "correctness". The

basis of this standard, according to Covey, is State v. Thurman,
846 P.2d 1256, 1270, n.ll (Utah 1993).

However, this case and

footnote do not support Covey's conclusion that the decision of the
trial

court

to receive

evidence

on the value

of

stock and

attorney's fees and costs on remand is jurisdictional and should
therefore

be

reviewed

on

appeal

for

correctness.

Covey's

characterization of the issues and standard of review are contrary
to the

statements

of

the

Supreme

Court

discretion of the trial court on remand.

in relation

to the

The Supreme Court has

stated:
. . . [W] here the entire case is not settled by the
appellate tribunal where certain issues are left open by
its judgment or decree, the trial court ordinarily has
discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as
to those matters which have been left open.
The rule is well stated in 3 Am. Jur. 737, Sec.
1241:
"If a cause is remanded without specific
directions, or with general directions for a new trial
either upon an affirmance or reversal, the lower court
2

has, as a general rule, the power to permit amendments
and the parties are free to make such proper amendments
to the pleadings as the trial court in its discretion may
allow.
. . . And while it may be said that such
amendments to the pleadings are not a matter of right,
but may be allowed in the discretion of the court, it is
the duty of the trial court to exercise it's discretion
in the matter of allowing amendments, unless the findings
and conclusions of the appellate court cover the entire
case and leave nothing open for further examination,
thereby making it the duty of the trial court to enter
judgment in accordance with the decision rendered."
The principles boil down to this fundamental
proposition: As to all matters adjudicated by the
appellate court, both the trial court and the parties are
foreclosed from further trying those matters.
They
become the law of the case. But as to matters left open
by the appellate court, it is within the sound discretion
of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental
pleadings as to those matters. [Emphasis added]
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d
153, 158 (1948). The trial court, then, has significant discretion
over the conduct of the proceedings on remand. This discretion is
not jurisdictional as to the power of the trial court.

The trial

court has its full jurisdiction over a remanded case, just as if
the case had never been tried.

The trial court simply must not

transcend the law of the case established on appeal.
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is
reversed and remanded with specific instruction or
directions, the case stands in the lower court precisely
as it did before a trial was had in the first instance.
Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1979) (citing Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 203, 134 P. 885, 887
(1913)).

After the appellate court has made its decision and

remitted the case back to the trial court, the case stands in the
trial court as if it had never been tried.

Therefore, the

jurisdiction of the trial court is not at issue; the proper issue
3

is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
deciding what

issues

to consider.

Therefore, the abuse of

discretion standard is appropriate to review the taking of evidence
and allowing amended pleadings by the trial court on remand.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures states:
. . . The court may reserve, affirm, modify, or otherwise
dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the
findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court may
order the trial court or agency to supplement, modify, or
complete the findings to make them conform to the issues
presented and the facts as found from the evidence and
may direct the trial court or agency to enter judgement
in accordance with the findings as revised. The court
may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass
upon and determine all questions of law involved in the
case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final
determination of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Susan Slattery (hereinafter "Slattery") is a former employee
of Covey & Co. (hereinafter "Covey"), who initiated this litigation
to recover damages she suffered when Covey defamed her.

Covey

counterclaimed and alleged that Slattery owed Covey the outstanding
balance in Slattery's error account.

After a bench trial, the

trial court dismissed Slattery's claim for defamation and held that
Covey was not entitled to the balance of Slattery's error account
and that Slattery was entitled to offsets and the value of her
stock. The trial court awarded judgement to Slattery to the extent
the offsets and value of her stock exceeded the balance of the
error account. Covey appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed in
4

part,

reversed

proceedings.

in

part,

and

remanded

in

part

for

further

On remand, the trial court received evidence and

awarded a judgment to Slattery for the value of her Future Time
stock and Bell Weather stock.

The trial court also awarded

Slattery her attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal and at
the evidentiary hearing conducted on September 2, 1993.
December 8, 1993, Covey & Co.

On

filed notice of appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On July 7, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its

decision in Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P. 2d 243 (Utah App.
1993)(Case No. 910570-CA)("Slattery I").

In its opinion the Utah

Court of Appeals held that Slattery " . . . was owed the value of
her personal accounts . . ."by Covey, but reversed the judgment as
to the value

of her

sufficient basis.

securities because

Id. at 249.

the evidence

lacked

The Court of Appeals remanded the

case to the trial court for "further proceedings consistent with
[its] opinion.
2.

Id. at 250.

On August 6, 1993, the Utah

notice of remittitur in Slattery I.
3.

Court of Appeals issued a

R. 779.

On August 18, 1993, counsel for Slattery scheduled a

hearing on the value of securities in Slattery's personal account
at Covey.
4.

R. 793.
On September

1, 1993, Slattery moved

to amend the

pleadings to allow the trial court to award attorney's fees and
costs.

R. 802, 804.

5

5. On September 2, 1993, a hearing before the district court
was held.

At

that hearing,

counsel

for Covey

objected

to

Slattery's claim for fees and the value of the stock arguing that
the district court had no jurisdiction on remand to hear those
issues.

R. 919-925.

The district court overruled the objection

and allowed Slattery to present evidence on attorney's fees and the
value of the securities.
6.

The

district

R. 913-977.
court

entered

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law finding the value of Future Time and Bell
Weather stock and reserved the issue of attorneys' fees for further
briefing.
7.

R. 834-36.
After briefing the attorney's fee issue, on October 14,

1993, the district court issued a minute entry awarding attorney's
fees for the appeal of Slattery I and for the September 2, 1993
hearing.
8.

R. 894-95.
On November 8, 1993, the District Court entered judgment

against Covey and in favor of Slattery.
9.

R. 896-98.

On December 8, 1993 Covey filed a notice of appeal.

R.

899.
10.

Covey does not challenge the sums awarded to Slattery,

but only whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider
the value of the stock and the attorney's fee issues.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals in Slattery I reversed and remanded part
of the trial court's decision for further proceedings.

Those

proceedings were to make findings concerning Slattery's expenses
6

and to determine the value of the stock Slattery owned. The Court
of Appeals failed to decide the issue of attorney's fees on appeal.
Covey misinterprets the mandate of the Court of Appeals and argues
that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by determining the
value of Slattery's stock and awarding attorney's fees.

But the

mandate contemplated an evidentiary hearing to establish the value
of the stock. Since the value and the disposition of the stock was
intended to be resolved on remand, the trial court clearly had
jurisdiction to determine the issue. In addition, the trial court
may decide all issues raised at the trial court which were
unresolved on appeal.

Since attorney's fees and the value of the

stock were not decided by the appellate court, the trial court had
discretion to decide these issues. The determination of the trial
court must therefore be sustained.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
ON REMAND WHEN IT RECEIVED EVIDENCE OF
STOCK VALUE AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
The single legal issue presented by Covey on appeal is whether
the

trial

court

had

jurisdiction

to

consider

the value of

Slattery's stock and attorney's fees in light of the Court of
Appeals' ruling in Slattery I.

At the evidentiary hearing, Covey

objected to the trial court's consideration of stock value and
attorney's

fees,

claiming

that determination

exceeded its jurisdiction on remand.

of those issues

R. 918-926.

Despite the

objection, Judge Young held that the remand from the Court of
Appeals did not preclude the trial court from hearing evidence on
7

the issues which he found were unresolved by the Court of Appeals.
Id.
Covey asserts that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
in hearing these issues because the jurisdiction of the trial court
is limited by the mandate of the Court of Appeals. As support for
this position Covey cites a New Mexico case which states, "The
district courts have only such jurisdiction on remand as the
opinion and mandate of the appellate court specifies."

Vinton

Eppsco. Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, Inc., 638 P.2d 1070,
1071 (N.M. 1981) .

This, however, is not the law in Utah.

Rule

30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states:
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reserve,
affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or
judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a
case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court
or agency to supplement, modify, or complete the findings
to make them conform to the issues presented and the
facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial
court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the
findings as revised. The court may also order a new
trial or further proceedings to be conducted. If a new
trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine
all questions of law involved in the case presented upon
the appeal and necessary to the final determination of
the case. [Emphasis added]
The permissive language of Rule 30(a) gives significant discretion
to the appellate court in rendering its decisions.

The reviewing

court may specifically instruct the trial court on the issues, may
limit the trial court's areas of consideration, and may resolve all
or a portion of the issues in the case.

Ld.

The trial court is

thereafter bound by the determination of the appellate court which
becomes the law of the case.

8

"The rule is well established and there does not
seem to be anything to the contrary that when a case has
been determined by a reviewing court and remanded to the
trial court, the duty of the latter is to comply with the
mandate of the former. The mandate is binding on the
lower court and must be strictly followed and carried
into effect according to its true intent and meaning as
determined by the directions given by the reviewing
court.
..."
Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d
153, 157 (1948)(quoting Utah Copper Co. V. District Court, 91 Utah
377, 64 P.2d 241, 250

(1937)).

The Supreme Court in Street

addresses the exact issue presented by Covey.

The Court states:

Before examining directly into our decree, with the
view of determining whether or not defendant court has
violated it, it may be profitable to observe some of the
general principles involved in the construction of the
mandate of an appellate court to a trial court,
particularly as to amendment of pleadings after
remittitur.
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is
affirmed or reversed and remanded with directions to
enter a particular judgment, the trial court may not
permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to
try rights already settled. 9 Bancroft, op. cit. Sec.
7430. This rule is not only reasonable, but necessary,
if litigation is ever to come to an end.
After an
appellate court has once ruled upon issues presented to
it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and the
trial court is bound to follow it, even though it
considers the ruling erroneous.
But where the entire case is not settled by the
appellate tribunal where certain issues are left open by
its judgment or decree, the trial court ordinarily has
discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as
to those matters which have been left open.
The rule is well stated in 3 Am. Jur. 737, Sec.
1241:
"If a cause is remanded without specific
directions, or with general directions for a new trial
either upon an affirmance or reversal, the lower court
has, as a general rule, the power to permit amendments
and the parties are free to make such proper amendments
to the pleadings as the trial court in its discretion may
allow.
. . . And while it may be said that such
9

amendments to the pleadings are not a matter of right,
but may be allowed in the discretion of the court, it is
the duty of the trial court to exercise it's discretion
in the matter of allowing amendments, unless the findings
and conclusions of the appellate court cover the entire
case and leave nothing open for further examination,
thereby making it the duty of the trial court to enter
judgment in accordance with the decision rendered."
The principles boil down to this fundamental
proposition: As to all matters adjudicated by the
appellate court, both the trial court and the parties are
foreclosed from further trying those matters.
They
become the law of the case. But as to matters left open
by the appellate court, it is within the sound discretion
of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental
pleadings as to those matters. [Emphasis added]
Id. at 157-58.

This general principle has also been stated:

On remand, the trial court may consider and decide
any matters left open by the appellate court and is free
to make any order or direction in further progress of the
case, not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate
court, as to any question not presented or settled by
such decision.
The issues are generally open on a
retrial when a case is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error § 992 (1962).

The law is clear that

the issues determined and completely resolved by the appellate
court become the law of the case and cannot be further reviewed or
violated.

However, those issues left open by the appellate court

may be determined by the trial court on remand.
The jurisdiction of the trial court is not dependant on the
mandate of the reviewing court.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in

Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1979) (citing Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 203, 134 P. 885, 887
(1913)) :
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is
reversed and remanded with specific instruction or
10

directions, the case stands in the lower court precisely
as it did before a trial was had in the first instance.
The Court in Larsen stated:
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is
reversed and a new trial granted without any specific
instructions or directions, the case stands in the lower
court precisely as it did before a trial was had in the
first instance. The general rule in this regard is well
stated in 3 Ency. L. & P. 579, in the following language:
"When a decree is reversed and the cause remanded without
specific directions, the decision of the court below is
entirely abrogated, and the cause then stands in the
court below precisely as if no trial had occurred, and
that court has the same power over the record as it had
before its decree was rendered, and it may permit
amendments to the pleadings to the same extent that it
might have done before the trial and in the exercise of
the same discretion, except that it is concluded by the
legal principles announced by the appellate court. And
where a cause is reversed and remanded with directions to
proceed in conformity with the view expressed in the
opinion filed, and it appears from such opinion that the
grounds of reversal are of a character which may be
obviated by subsequent amendments of the pleadings or the
introduction of additional evidence it is the duty of the
trial court to permit the cause to be redocketed and to
permit amendments to be made and evidence introduced on
the hearing just as though it was then being heard for
the first time. [Emphasis added]
The trial court's jurisdiction is not dependant on the mandate
issued by the reviewing court, but the issues the trial court may
consider are limited by the rulings of the appellate court. When
the reviewing court fails to dispose of all the issues, the trial
court must make the final determination on those undecided issues
without

conflicting with

the ruling

of the reviewing court.

Covey's position would greatly limit the jurisdiction of the trial
court and render the trial court incapable of responding to the
practical problems arising on remand.

This result would shackle

the entire judicial system by increasing the number of appeals and
11

preventing the trial courts from using discretion to finalize and
dispose of cases on remand.
Apparently, Covey misunderstands the jurisdiction of the trial
court upon remand.

Covey asserts, through cases from other

jurisdictions, that the trial court's jurisdiction on remand is
limited to the mandate of the reviewing court.

In other words,

Covey asserts that the trial court's jurisdiction is exclusive to
the mandate ordered by the reviewing court.

However, Covey gives

no Utah precedent or authority for this position. Nor can it. The
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court indicate that the jurisdiction
of the trial court

is inclusive: on remand

the trial court

possesses all of the powers granted to trial courts by the
Constitution

and

statutes

of

the

State

of Utah.

The only

limitation on the trial courts' discretion is the law of the case
created by the reviewing court.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE THE VALUE
OF SLATTERY'S STOCK
The Court of Appeals in Slattery I held that Slattery was owed
the value of the stock she owned, but the evidence of the stock's
value was insufficient.
were reversed.

Therefore, the findings of stock value

Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249

(Utah App. 1993).

The Court contemplated further proceedings to

determine the value of that stock.

The Court stated:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Slattery to amend her complaint to conform to evidence
that she was owed the value of her personal accounts, but
we determine that the evidence lacks a sufficient basis
12

to support the value assigned to those personal accounts.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment that
Slattery is entitled to $6,847,50 for these accounts.
[Emphasis added]
Id. at 249. The Court specifically reversed only the value of the
stock and found that Slattery was owed the stock and Covey must pay
her its value. Id. The Court's mandate instructed the trial court
to conduct

".

. . further proceedings consistent with th[e]

opinion." Id. at 250. The "further proceedings" were to determine
the value of the stock Slattery owned.

What other proceedings

could have been contemplated by the Court of Appeals?

On remand,

the trial court received evidence of the value of the stock and
awarded it to Slattery.

Logically, the Court of Appeals would not

have affirmed the amendment of the complaint to conform to the
evidence presented, and then, in the same sentence, nullified and
invalidated the amendment by finding that evidence insufficient,
without expecting further proceedings.

The reversal contemplated

an evidentiary hearing to establish the value of the stock Slattery
owned.
Even if the Court of Appeals did not specifically remand the
case for further proceedings to determine the value of the stock,
its value and disposition remained an unresolved issue on remand.
When an issue is left open by the reviewing court, the trial court
has discretion to dispose of that issue. Street v. Fourth Judicial
District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948).

In an

appropriate use of its discretion, on remand the trial court
received evidence of the stock's value and resolved the issue by
awarding that value to Slattery.
13

Covey overstates the mandate issued by the Court of Appeals.
A mandate is a clear statement directing the trial court's action
on certain issues. The contrast between the mandate and the issues
left open for the trial court's further determination on remand is
illustrated in Slattery I. The Court excluded certain expenses and
added another to Slattery's account and found the total allowed
credits.

The Court then stated, "We remand this particular issue

to the trial court for entry of findings consistent with this
opinion."

[Emphasis added].

Id. at 248.

The decision of the

Court of Appeals on Slattery's expenses is a clear and complete
disposition of that particular issue.
$406.24.

The total credits were

There is no room for interpretation.

But there is no specific mandate disposing of the stock issue.
The Court simply reversed the finding of value.

If no further

proceedings may be conducted relating to the stock, as Covey
suggests, what would become of the stock in Slattery's account?
Would the stock be forfeited to Covey?
to the certificates?

Would Slattery be entitled

Would the stock simply languish in the

account with no one able to assert a beneficial interest?

If the

Court of Appeals had issued a mandate to the trial court, these
questions would have been answered and the trial court would have
had no discretion in answering them.

But the Court of Appeals

failed to completely dispose the stock issue and the trial court
appropriately exercised its discretion to resolve this issue.
Covey cites Bryfogle v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 739 P. 2d
819 (Ariz. App. 1987), for the proposition that a specific mandate
14

from the appellate court cannot be exceeded by the trial court on
remand.

This is consistent with the pronouncements of the Utah

Supreme Court in Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113 Utah
60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948), and Utah Copper Co. v. District Court, 91
Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241, 250 (1937) .

The Utah courts have not,

however, characterized the power of the trial court on remand as
jurisdictional, but as discretional. Utah courts have held that if
the discretion of the trial court is utilized to violate the
mandate of the appellate court, the trial court would be subject to
a writ of mandamus or appellate review.

Street v. Fourth Judicial

District Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153

(1948).

With this

exception, the Bryfogle and the Street decisions are consistent.
Covey argues that the "sole purpose" of the remand was to
correct the findings of fact to eliminate credits given to Slattery
for the charges to her error account.

Appellant's brief, p. 9.

This position ignores the specific language of the Court of
Appeal's opinion.

The Court remanded that "particular issue" to

the trial court for the entry of findings and a judgment consistent
with the ruling of the Court.
P.2d 243, 248

Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857

(Utah App. 1993).

But the opinion finds that

Slattery owned stock and was entitled to be paid its value. Id. at
249.
stock.

The question reversed by the Court was the value of that
The mandate instructed that

"further proceedings" be

conducted consistent with its opinion. Id. at 250. The Court need
not give two mandates to the trial court for the disposition of a
single issue worth $406.24. Therefore, the purpose of the remand
15

was to correct the expenses and determine the value of the stock.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY ALLOWING SLATTERY TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT AND
BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE SLATTERY'S
APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
Covey claims that because the issue of attorney's fees on
appeal was mentioned by the Court of Appeals, the trial court is
precluded from considering whether to award attorney's fees for the
appeal. Again, Covey justifies this position by claiming that the
jurisdiction of the trial court is limited by the mandate of the
Court of Appeals.
above.

This issue of law is addressed in the Argument

In Slattery I, the Court of Appeals states:

4. Slattery also seeks attorney fees on appeal,
based on the employment contract. However, she was not
awarded attorney fees at trial and did not appeal from
that determination. Because Slattery does not present
any argument to support her request for fees on appeal,
we decline to address the issue.
Slattery v. Covey & Co,. Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249, n.4 (Utah App.
1993).

This refusal to address the issue of attorney's fees on

appeal

is not a determination by the Court of Appeals that

attorney's fees are not available to Slattery for the appeal. The
Court of Appeals did not deny, strike, or dismiss the request for
fees.

It simply refused to address the issue.

Therefore, the

Court of Appeals made no determination of attorney's fees on
appeal.

Since

the

issue

of

fees

on appeal

was

not

fully

determined, the trial court has discretion to consider them.
On September 1, 1993, Slattery filed a motion to amend the
complaint to included a claim for attorney's fees.
16

R. 804.

The

trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to establish the
attorney's fees on appeal.

After the evidentiary hearing, the

issue of attorney's fees was briefed by the parties.

The trial

court issued its minute entry on October 14, 1993, which states in
part:
In many ways, as this Court candidly stated to
counsel, this case illustrates the pathetic circumstances
that can occur when one parties [sic] fail to
realistically
evaluate their cases and consider
settlement. To require the Plaintiff to incur cost and
fees in the amount of $15,490.05 to sustain a judgment of
$10,801.35 is improper. The Defendant is an employing
company with obviously greater resources to employ
counsel and to defend claims.
That alone does not
justify imposing costs and fees. However, in this case,
the Court finds that there was an adequate contractual
basis and equitable basis to order that the plaintiff be
awarded the fees incurred to protect her judgment on
appeal. Thus the Plaintiff is awarded $15,490.05 in fees
and costs incurred on appeal.
R. 894-95.

In the Judgment granting fees, the trial court found

that Covey acted improperly and in bad faith.

R. 896-98.

Covey

does not appeal the amount of fees or the finding of bad faith, but
simply argues that the trial court exceeded its authority in
awarding any fees at all.
Covey cites Vinton Eppsco Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes,
Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 638 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1981), for the proposition
that "[a]ppellate courts have authority to either make an allowance
of attorney fees on appeal or to remand to the lower court for that
purpose." Slattery agrees that the appellate courts have authority
to award attorneys fees or remand the case to the trial court for
the determination of fees.

However, the implication that the

appellate courts are bound to elect one of those options is
17

contrary to the Utah law.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule

30(a); Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court. 113 Utah 60, 191
P. 2d

153

(1948) (both

reflecting

reviewing court to make decisions).

the vast

discretion

of

the

The appellate court may not

decide an issue, may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose
of the issues presented.
The holding in Showe Homes is based on the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision to deny attorney's fees in the original appeal and
reversed the trial court for exceeding its mandate when it awarded
fees for the original appeal on remand.

In Slattery I, the Court

of Appeals did not decide the issue of attorney's fees, and
expressly indicated that it "decline[d] to address the [attorney's
fee] issue.11 Slattery v. Covey & Co.. Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249, n.4
(Utah App. 1993).

Since the Court of Appeals did not decide the

issue of attorney's fees in their decision, the mandate to the
district court could not have precluded the authority of the
district court to determine the issue of attorney's fees.
The acceptance of Covey's argument would increase the number
appeals and the cost of litigation by eliminating the discretion of
the trial court to fully dispose of cases on remand.
issues encountered

Appeals

raising

incidental

on remand would become

common.

In Bank of New Mexico v. Earl Rice Construction Co., 79

N.M. 115, 440 P.2d 790 (1968), a detailed ruling and mandate was
issued by the New Mexico Supreme Court.

The mandate stated:

NOW, THEREFORE, this cause is hereby remanded to you
with directions to set aside the present judgment and
enter a new judgment which (1) awards plaintiff judgment
against Earl B. Rice and Lahoma Rice jointly and
18

severally on the promissory notes, in the amount of
$64,754.80; (2)awards Earl Rice Construction Company,
Inc. judgment against Plaintiff on its breach of contract
claim, in the amount of $5,000.00 compensatory damages
and $50,000.00 punitive damages; and (3) awards judgment
in favor of Plaintiff on the counterclaim of Earl B.
Rice. The successful parties are to recover their costs
in district court; costs on appeal are to be paid equally
by Plaintiff, Rice and the Corporation.
Id. The mandate did not address the date interest on the judgment
would begin to run.
because

The trial court denied any award of interest

it exceeded

determined

the

its mandate.

effect

of

its

The appellate

earlier

ruling,

court then
whether

its

determination constituted a reversal or a modification of the
earlier judgment, and despite the explicit language of the mandate,
held that the earlier judgment did not set aside but modified the
original decision.

Interest was granted from the date of the

original judgment.

Although a valid issue was presented in Earl

Rice, under Covey's interpretation of the law, appeals of minor
details on remand would become common, would be abused to buy time
for the judgment debtor, and would increase the cost of litigation.
Utah mandates are rarely as specific or detailed as the
mandate in Earl Rice.

Certainly the "mandate" set forth in

Slattery I does not specifically dispose of all the issues relating
to the value of the stock and attorney fees.

The district court

therefore appropriately received evidence and issued a final ruling
on the issues.
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POINT III
SLATTERY IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
RELATING TO THIS APPEAL
Slattery's contract with Covey provides that in the event of
any litigation arising from the contract, the prevailing party
would be entitled to recover any costs and expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred in the litigation.
1 14.

Addendum Exhibit A,

If Slattery is successful in defending this appeal, she is

entitled to her attorney's fees related to defending this appeal.
CONCLUSION
When a case is remanded from the appellate court, the trial
court's discretion is limited by the decision of the appellate
court. Any unresolved issues left open by the appellate court may
be considered and decided by the trial court.

Since the Court of

Appeals in Slattery I contemplated further hearings to determine
the value of the stock, the trial court fulfilled the mandate of
the Court of Appeals by finding the value of the stock and awarding
it to Slattery.

Even if the Court of Appeals' mandate did not

require the trial court to determine the value of the stock, the
Court's decision did not determine the fate of the stock or the
issue

of

attorney's

fees.

Therefore,

the

trial

court was

authorized to determine those issues in fully disposing of the
issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in receiving
evidence or ruling on these issues.

Since the district court

clearly had jurisdiction over the case and the issues unresolved by
the Court of Appeals, the determination of the value of the stock
and the attorney's fees awarded to Slattery are justified within
20

the court's sound discretion. The ruling of the trial court should
be sustained.
DATED this

c^P

day of March, 1995.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to David R. King, KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C,
Eight Floor, Bank One Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101-2034, postage prepaid, this
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day of J^larch, 1995.

A D D E N D U M

Addendum A: Exhibit 18-D,
Contract for the Performance of Services
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CONTRACT FOR PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES
THIS CONTRACT is made and entered into this .^ cs day of rtjCkeL
19^£X by a n d between COVEY & CO.f INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter
referred to as "Covey," and ^ t i c t i A j SoiVT-c:^/
* . an independent
contractor, hereinafter referred to as "Contractor."
I
For and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants hereinafter set
forth, Covey and Contractor agree as follows:
1. CONTRACT. Covey does hereby hire Contractor to perform certain
services on its behalf and Contractor hereby accepts such contract and agrees to
perform such services for Covey upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
2. DUTIES. Contractor's duties shall be to act as a registered securities
representative of Covey and to perform all duties necessary or desirable in
connection therewith, including but not limited to, solicitation of retail accounts and
the documentation and execution of orders in securities for clients of Contractor
and/or Covey.
3. WARRANTIES OF CONTRACTOR.
Contractor represents and
warrants that: he or she is registered as a general securities representative with the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD"); £e or she is registered
as an agent with the state of Utah; he or she is or will become registered as an agent
in all states in which the nature or type of his or her activities require such
registration but that he or she will neither become registered nor engage in
securities transactions in states where Covey is not registered as a broker-dealer; he
or she is registered and/or holds all other permits and licenses required by any
regulatory body as a prerequisite to the performance of the type of services which
Contractor will perform for Covey; and he or she will maintain all of the above
registrations, permits, and licenses in effect and in good standing during the term of
this Contract.
4. WARRANTIES OF COVEY. Covey represents and warrants that it
will maintain current and proper registration as a broker-dealer in the state of Utah
and in every other state which Covey represents to Contractor are states in which
Contractor may engage in securities transactions with customers of Covey.
5. COMPENSATION. Covey agrees to compensate Contractor on a strict
commission basis. Such commissions shall be paid to Contractor on the sixth
business day of the month following the month in which such commissions were
earned. The amount of such commissions payable to Covey to Contractor shall be
computed and paid in accordance with the schedule attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by reference.* Covey reserves the right to change the terms
of the commission schedule set forth on Exhibit "A" at any time and from time to
time upon thirty (30) days advance notice to Contractor. In any such event, the new
scneduie snail be suosututed for the schedule currently attacned hereto as Exhibit
"A."

6. FACILITIES- Covey shall permit Contractor to conduct his or her
business and render his or her services on the premises of Covey. Covey shall
provide Contractor with order tickets, form agreements, and account cards to be used
oy Contractor in conducting his business. Covey will also provide Contractor office
space with desk, chair, and cabinet files.
7. CONTRACTOR'S EXPENSES- Contractor snail be solely responsible
for and shall pay the following costs and charges unless otherwise agreed to in
Addendum A attached hereto and made a part hereof:
(a) all costs of obtaining, renewing, and maintaining all licenses
and registrations required by the applicable rules and regulations of the
NASD; the Securities and Exchange Commission; any commodities,
stock, options, or other exchange through which Contractor effects
transactions; and the laws of each state in which Contractor is required to
be so licensed and/or registered, except that Contractor shall not be
required to pay state registration fees in each state in which Contractor is
registered in a calendar year so long as Contractor has business in each, of
said states which generates at least $300 in gross commissions;
(b) fifty percent (50%) of all telephone charges for long distance
calls made by, through, or under him or her;
(c) the cost of any quotation machine or other device used by
Contractor to obtain quotations or other access to the NASD's Automated
Quotation system or similar medium (such costs can be shared with other
contractors of Covey under arrangements between such other contractors
and Covey) with the exception that Covey will pay the basic office charge
for said quotation machine or devise;
(d) dues to professional organizations or subscriptions to
periodicals and information services; and
(e) fifty percent (50%) all costs and charges for health, accident,
casualty, and life insurance coverage carried by Contractor for the benefit
of Contractor and his or her family.
8. INVENTORY AND TRADING ACCOUNTS. In the event that
Contractor should use Covey's inventory of securities in securities transactions
conducted pursuant hereto, the terms and conditions
of such securities transactions
will be governed in accordance with an Exhibit WB" to be attached hereto.
9. COVETS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES. Contractor acknowledges
that the lists and ledgers of Covey's customers and transactions as they may now
exist or may hereafter exist from time to time are valuable, special, and unique
assets of Covey. Contractor acknowledges and agrees that Covey shall remain the
sole and exclusive owner of such lists and ledgers, which ownership includes the sole
and exclusive right to reproduce, use, or disclose for any purpose any or ail of the
names, addresses, records of transactions, or other data contained thereon, whether
such reproductions or uses were made by Contractor, Covey, or other officers,
directors, employees, or agents of Covey. Contractor will not, directly or indirectly,
during or after the term of his or her employment, disclose to any person without
prior written authorization from Covey, the names, addresses, telephone numbers,
transactions, or other data contained on such lists and ledgers; provided, that upon
•>

the termination of this Contract with Covey, Contractor may take with him or her
and make use of one copy of a list setting forth the names, addresses, and current
stock and cash positions of personal customers of Contractor whose accounts with
Covey were opened as a direct result of Contractor's efforts as well as one copy of his
or her rolodex file.
10. CONDUCT OF CONTRACTOR. Contractor acknowledges that his or
her activities and the activities of Covey are subject to regulation by several
different regulatory bodies. Many of such activities are regulated by formal statutes,
rules, and regulations while others are regulated by informal interpretations of
statutes, rules, and regulations or policy positions adopted by the various regulatorybodies. Contractor acknowledges that Covey has attempted to codify many of the
more informal regulations in its Manual of Supervisory Procedures. Contractor
hereby agrees to strictly comply with the practices, policies, and procedures
contained in the Manual of Supervisory Procedures (as hereinafter defined) and all
the applicable laws, rules, and regulations of each federal, state, or self-regulatory
authority having jurisdiction over the conduct of Contractor's business, including,
but not limited to, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as well as other statutes administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the laws administered by the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission; the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the NASD, and the
interpretations by the Board of Governors thereof; the rules of each exchange to
which the Contractor and the conduct of his or her business is subject: and the laws of
the respective states and the interpretations thereof which are applicable to
Contractor's activities, all with specific emphasis on the following:
(a) the registration or licensing requirements applicable to Covey
and Contractor prior to conducting business in any state;
(b) the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
applicable state securities statutes with respect to the sale of "restricted"
or "controlled" securities in the absence of registration thereunder;
(c) the solicitation of transactions in securities and compliance
with applicable secondary trading registration requirements' under
applicable state securities laws;
(d)

Regulation'T" promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board;

(e) the interpretations of the Board of Governors of the NASD
with respect to nfree-riding" and "withholding;"
(0 transactions effected by one person by or for the account of
another without a proper written power of attorney or other authorization
for such transactions; and
(g) transactions which violate the so-called anti-fraud or antimanipulative provisions of federal and state securities laws.
Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify Covey and hold it harmless from and against
any and all losses, costs, damages, claims, causes of action, or expenses whatsoever
(including, but not limited to, any and all legal or other expenses reasonably
incurred in investigating, preparing, or defending against any such actions or
threatened actions or claims) based on or arising out of or in connection with any
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violation or alleged violation by Contractor of any of the statutes, rules, regulations,
or interpretations described above or otherwise, and whether liability is determined
by a court, administrative agency, or other authority having jurisdiction in the
premises or is the result of a settlement arrived at prior to, during, or after suit. The
foregoing indemnification is conditioned upon the Contractor being notified by
Covey, by letter, telegram, or other advice, of any claim made against Covey or any
action commenced against Covey, within a reasonable time after it shall have been
provided notice of any claim or shall have been served by summons or other legal
process, giving information as to the nature and basis of the claim, and in any event
at least ten (10) days prior to the entry of any judgment on such claim or in such
action, but the failure to give such notice shall not relieve Contractor of his or her
obligation to provide indemnification for any liability whicn Covey may have to such
person otherwise than on account of this indemnification agreement. Contractor
shall bear the employment of counsel reasonably satisfactory to Covey, of any and all
fees reasonably incurred by Covey in connection with such matter. Covey shall have
the right to separate counsel in any such action and to participate in the defense
thereof, but the fees and expenses of such independent counsel shall be at the
expense of Covey unless (i) the employment thereof shall have been specifically
authorized by Contractor or (ii) Contractor shall have failed to assume the defense
and employ counsel satisfactory to Covey.
11. CONTRACTOR R E S P O N S I B L E FOR L O S S E S .
Contractor
acknowledges and agrees that he or she is responsible for his or her customer
accounts and bears sole responsibility for the timeiy payment; for securities
purchased by his or her customers and the timely delivery (in good deliverable form)
of securities sold by his or her customers. Contractor agrees that any and all losses
incurred by Covey in connection with the accounts of Contractor's customers,
including but not limited to, liquidation of trades, bad checks, or failure to deliver
"good" stock, which losses are not due to clear error on the part of Covey, shall be
paid by Contractor. Contractor agrees to use his or her best efforts to assist Covey in
collecting or minimizing any loss which may occur in his or her customer account.
12. NO B ENEFITS. Contractor acknowledges that he or she has been hired
by Covey as an independent contractor to perform specific services for Covey,
Contractor acknowledges and agrees that Covey will not provide Contractor with
certain of the benefits customarily provided by employers to their employees, such as
paid vacation or pension or profitsharing benefits. Contractor further acknowledges
that Covey will not withhold taxes from Contractor's compensation and that
Contractor is responsible to pay any and all applicable taxes on his or her earnings
and to make any estimated payments required by state or federal taxing authorities
in connection therewith.
13. RIGHT OF OFFSET. Any and all amounts due and owing to Covey
from Contractor by reason of any event described herein or for any breach by
Contractor of any term, covenant, or condition hereof may be offset by Covey, at its
sole discretion, against any compensation due and owing to Contractor, whether
during the term hereof, upon the'termination of this Contract, or otherwise or mav
be offset by Covey against any and all securities, accounts, or other properties of
Contractor held in Contractor's account or accounts with Covey or otherwise under
the care, custody, or control of Covey, including the products and proceeds thereof.
Any sales of Contractor's property effected by Covey in connection with this right of
offset may be public or orivate and may be made without notice or advertisement
and in such manner as Covey may, in its discretion, determine, with the exception
that Covey will delay effecting its right of offset provided Contractor is engaged m
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good faith and bona fide efforts to resolve any dispute with Covey over all such
amounts owed to Covey and/or provided Contractor is engaged in good faith and bona
fide efforts to make payment ot all such amounts owed to Covey. All such amounts
owed to Coveyshall bear interest at a rate which is 2i% above Covey's cost for
borrowed funds per annum, from and after the due date, both before and after
judgment if applicable. If any such amounts owed to Covey are due and owing to
Covey by Contractor on the date of termination of this Contract, Contractor agrees to
execute and deliver to Covey a promissory note evidencing such amounts and the
interest applicable thereto, which note shall be due on demand of Covey.
14. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of any litigation or other legal
proceeding between the parties arising from this Contract, the prevailing party shall
be entitled to recover, in addition to any other relief awarded or granted, his or her
reasonable costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) incurred in connection with
the proceeding,
15. TE RM. The term of this Contract shall commence on the date hereof and
shall remain in full force and effect for a period of one (1) year. Thereafter, the term
of this Contract shall automatically be extended for successive and consecutive
terms of one (1) year each unless and until terminated by either party in writing at
least fourteen (14) days in advance of the effective date of termination; provided, that
in the event Contractor fails to perform any of the obligations to be performed by Mm
or her hereunder, Covey may terminate this Contract immediately upon notice to
Contractor.
16. GOVERNING LAW. This Contract is being executed and delivered in
the state of Utah and shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the state of Utah.
17. SEVERABILITY. In the event any provision of this Contract, or the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, shall conflict with or
be held invalid or unenforceable under the laws of any jurisdiction by a court having
jurisdiction in the premises, then such conflict shall not affect any other provision of
this Contract which can be given effect without the conflicting provision, and the
remainder of the Contract or the application of such provisions to persons or
circumstances other than those as to which such provisions are held, invalid or
unenforceable shall not be affected thereby. The invalidity or unenforceability of
this Contract or any provision thereof in any jurisdiction shall not affect the validity
or enforceability of this Contract or of such provision in any other jurisdiction. To
this end, the provisions of this Contract are declared to be severable.
18. REFORMATION. In the event it is determined by a court having
jurisdiction in the premises that any provision herein is void or unenforceable by
reason of public policy, then this Contract shall continue in full force and effect to the
extent permissible under the existing public policy. In this regard, the parties
hereby authorize the court having jurisdiction of the matter to determine the extent
to which this Contract is enforceable and to enforce the same in accordance with the
existing public policy in any manner which is acceptable to the court. It is
understood by the parties that Covey and Contractor would not have entered into
this Contract but for the existence of the indemnification provisions contained
herein.

19. NON- WAIVER. The failure by Covey to object to or give notice of any
default by Contractor of any term, covenant, or condition hereof shall not constitute
a waiver by Covey of any subsequent breach or default under this Contract.
20. HEADINGS. The headings of the paragraphs contained herein are for
convenience only and are not intended to define or limit the contents thereof*
21. BINDING EFFECT. All of the rights and obligations of the parties to
this Contract shall bind and the benefits shall inure to their respective heirs, legal
representatives, successors, and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this agreement has been executed as of the date
first above written.
COVE
EY&CO^INC. f

ft

Dilfy Autnonzea Officer \

Independent Contractor
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EXHIBIT "An
COMMISSION COMPENSATION
Contractor and Covey agree that Covey will pay Contractor according to the
following schedule, where gross commissions are defined as the commissions
generated by either contractor or customer transactions less a $5 ticket charge per
each agency trade, less any give up charge on listed trades:

Monthly Gross Commission

Percentage of
Gross Commission
Pavable to Contractor

Under $2,000
$2,000 to less than $4,000
$4,000 to less than $10,000
Over $10,000

30%
40%
50%
52.5%

In the event Contractor's gross commissions should reach $50,000 during any
Covey fiscal year, Contractor will be paid at least 50% of gross commissions
generated by Contractor for said entire fiscal year. Any commission adjustments
necessary to meet the requirements of this paragraph will be made at the end of the
Covey fiscal year in which such adjustments are required.
Additional percentages will be paid to Contractor in the same manner as set
forth in the foregoing paragraph when Contractor's annual gross commissions
during any Covey fiscal year reach the following levels:
Annual Gross Commission

Additional Percentage Paid
on Total Gross Commission

Over $120,000
Over $200,000
Over $300,000

An additional 2\%
An additional 1\%
An additional 2£%

All of the foregoing provisions of this Exhibit "A" notwithstanding, during his
or her first full year of employment, the percentage of gross commission payable to
Contractor will not be less than 50% on either a monthly or yearly basis.
Employment date:
COVEY & CO., INC.

Duly Authorized Officer

EXHIBIT "Bw

TRADING ACCOUNTS (Traders)
Contractor and Covey agree that all profits and losses resulting" from.
Contractor's use of Covey's inventory of securities (trading account #98-000) will be split on an equal 50/50 basis after deducting a $4.00 ticket charge
fo7 each wnolesale trade. Profits and losses will be settled on the 15th.calendar day
of the month in which profits and losses occurred.
Contractor will maintain a deposit with Covey in an amount equal to 50% of
the market value of his trading account. For periods of time solely within the
discretion of Covey, Covey may allow the market value of Contractor's trading
account to exceed 50% of Contractor's deposit. During such periods, Contractor will
be charged interest on the amount of Contractor's trading account market value in
excess of 50% of Contractor's deposit at a per annum rate equal to Covey's cost for
borrowed funds. In the event Contractor's deposit is in excess of 50% of the market
value of Contractor's trading account, Covey agrees to pay Contractor interest on
such excess at a per annum rate equal to the per annum rate Daid by Covey to its
customers on free credit balances. The purpose of Contractor's deposit is to assist in
the financing of the securities positions maintained in Contractor's trading account
(98-000) as well as to offset any losses which may occur in said trading
account.
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EXHIBITS

TRADING ACCOUNTS (Registered Representatives)
It will be within the sole discretion of Covey to allow Contractor (who is not
classified.as a "trader" for Covey) to utilize Covey's inventory of securities in
transactions effected by Contractor. In the event that Covey should exercise its
discretion to allow Contractor to so utilize its inventory of securities, no monetary
deposit will be required of Contractor of Covey with the exception that it shall be
within the sole discretion of Covey to require Contractor to make a deposit of up to
25% of the market value of any securities position consisting of Covey's inventory of
securities carried by Contractor from the end of any month to the beginning of the
following month. It will also be within the sole discretion of Covey to either allow
Contractor to carry a securities position consisting of Covey's inventory of securities
over from the end of any month to the beginning 01 the following month or to prohibit
the same.
All profits realized by Contractor from the use of Covey's inventory of securities
will be recorded as part of Contractor's gross commission and Contractor will be paid
a portion of said profits in accordance with the commission schedules set forth in
Exhibit "A" to this agreement. All losses realized by Contractor from the use of
Covey's inventory of securities will first be subtracted from the total sales credit
generated in Covey's inventory account for the same time period and thereafter will
be debited to Contractor's "error account" where it will become an obligation owed by
Contractor to Covey. It is hereby understood that Contractor is liable to Covey for
100% of all losses realized by Contractor through the utilization of Covey's inventory
of securities.
Regular commissions will be computed on transactions effected by Contractor
utilizing Covey's inventory of securities at rates periodically negotiated between
Covey and Contractor. Said commissions will be recorded as part of Contractor's
gross commissions and Contractor will be paid a portion of said commissions in
accordance with Schedule "A" to this agreement. However, Contractor and Covey
agree that an amount of S5 will be deducted for each trade that generates a
commission effected by Contractor utilizing Covey's inventory of securities from the
portion of Contractor's gross commissions payable to Contractor in accordance with
Schedule "A" attached to this agreement.
COVEY & CO., INC.

By:

\i )a-+
Duly Authorized Officer

Independent Contractor

H

Addendum to Contract for
Performance of Services

I,

Susan Slattery

, hereby acknowledge and affirm that

the attached Contract for Performance of Services dated

3*30-88

is

a true, accurate, and complete description of the terms and conditions of my
agreement with Covey & Co., Inc., for performance of services for said firm from
7-20-37

until execution of the attached C o n t r a c t for

Performance of Services to which this document is an addendum and accurately
describes the terms of our oral agreement that has been in effect since such date.

Independent Contractor
COVEY & CO., INC.

By:

L.kjjsr;

July Authorized Officer

\^

